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Appendix B.
to `Internet Auctions with Many Traders.
(The Appendix contains the proofs of Lemma 5, Corollary 1, and Lemmas 3-9 in the proof of
Theorem 2.)
Proof of Lemma 5: Since buyer i's deviation to ¾ does not change the lowest standing bid
at the terminal stage, she cannot get a higher payo® after this deviation unless in state ¡ she
either holds more than one high bid equal to or greater than v¡ with sellers in S¡(v¡), or she
holds a single such high bid and her valuation is strictly less than v¡. To see this, note that
by Lemma 2 two aspects of the outcome for buyer i are random when all buyers follow ¾¤: (a)
the price which i pays to a seller where her high bid in ¡ is in Bd
¡ could be either v¡ or v¡ +d
(she wins all the units where she holds such high bids); (b) her high bid(s) equal to v¡ may be
outbid in G¡ or not. If i deviates to ¾ in G¡ and the lowest standing bid at the terminal stage
remains equal to v¡, she will still win all the units where her high bids at ¡ are strictly above
v¡ at prices which are no less than the ones she would pay if she had not deviated. However,
the expected outcomes of aspects (a) and (b) could be di®erent because the probability with
which another buyer submits a bid equal to v¡ at a seller in S¡(v¡) where i holds a high bid
equal to or above v¡ could change as a result of this deviation.
So, suppose that in state ¡ i holds w1 high bids equal to v¡ with a set of sellers
W(i;v¡) 2 S¡(v¡) and w2 high bids in Bd
¡ with a set of sellers W(i;d) 2 S¡(v¡) s.t. w1+w2 ¸ 1,
and either w1 ¸ 2 or w2 ¸ 1 if vi ¸ v¡. The outcomes of (a) and (b) depend on whether other
buyers submit bids higher than v¡ at sellers in W(i;v¡) and W(i;d). Since the continuation
game G¡ is ¯nite, by the one-deviation property we can restrict consideration to strategies ¾
which involve a deviation from ¾¤ only at one information set.
First, suppose that this single deviation involves an un unsuccessful bid by buyer i.
This deviation a®ects only the standing bid of a seller where this bid is placed, but a®ects
neither the order in which the other buyers move, nor the strategy according to which they
bid at other sellers. Thus, an unsuccessful bid does not a®ect the outcome.
Now suppose that i deviates from ¾¤ in G¡ by submitting a successful bid bi (i.e. a bid
which becomes a high bid) at some information set S0. To show that this causes i's payo® to
decrease, let us compare buyer i's expected payo®s in two continuation games le and lf which
36start in information set S0, but in lf i makes the described deviation at S0, while in le buyer
i passes at S0 as prescribed by ¾¤. i follows ¾¤ after information set S0 in both le and lf. We
need to consider two di®erent cases: Case(i): bi < v¡; Case (ii): bi ¸ v¡.
Case (i): bi < v¡. We will show that i has the same expected payo®s in le and lf,




bi+d) denote the earliest information set in le (lf) in which the lowest
standing bid is equal to bi +d. Se
bi+d and S
f
bi+d have the following properties. First, no bidder
bids more than bi + d in le prior to Se
bi+d and in lf prior to S
f
bi+d, so any high bid of at least
bi + d at ¡ remains such in both Se
bi+d and S
f





¡(bi) have the same high bids and high bidders, as well as the same standing bids.
Second, i's deviating high bid bi is outbid for sure prior to information set S
f
bi+d. So, the sets







bi+d(:)) be the probability distribution over the set of high bidders
with sellers S0
¡(bi) at information set Se
bi+d (S
f
bi+d) given the information at S0 and the buyers'
strategies in the continuation game. That is, for any set Bw of #S0
¡(bi) buyers, Pk
bi+d(Bw)
(k 2 fe;fg) is the probability that at Sk










put probability 1 on the set of high bidders which includes the subset of buyers in Da
¡(bi) whose
indices are between #S0
¡(bi ¡ d) + 2-st and #S0
¡(bi) + 1-st among the buyers in Da
¡(bi) (these




bi+d(:) put equal probability on any subset of size #S0
¡(bi ¡ d) from
the set of #S0
¡(bi ¡d)+1 buyers in Da
¡(bi) with the lowest indices. That is, exactly one buyer
from the set of #S0
¡(bi ¡d)+1 buyers in Da




bi+d and each of these buyers is not a high bidder with the same probability.
This buyer has an opportunity to bid in Se
bi+d (S
f
bi+d). This is due to the fact the buyers enter
the game and submit their bids if they are outbid in order of their indices and that, according
to strategy ¾¤, they randomize with equal probability over the relevant sets of sellers.
Since all buyers follow ¾¤ in le (lf), buyer i's expected payo® in le (lf) depends only
on the pro¯le of the standing bids in Se
bi+d (S
f




bi+d(:)). But the pro¯les of the standing bids at Se
bi+d and S
f
bi+d are identical by de¯nition,
37and we have just shown that Pe
bi+d(:) and P
f
bi+d(:) are also identical. Therefore, i has the same
expected payo®s in le and lf.
Case (ii): bi ¸ v¡.
If vi · v¡, then buyer i's payo® is (weakly) decreasing in the number of units that she
wins. If vi > v¡, then buyer i's payo® is decreasing in the number of units that she wins in
excess of 1, and she wins at least one unit for sure in each of le and lf, because she follows
strategy ¾¤ after information set S0 and the lowest standing bid at the terminal stage is equal
to v¡. If w2 ¸ 1, i.e. buyer i holds high bids in Bd
¡ with sellers W(i;d) 2 S¡(v¡), then she wins
all these units and pays either v¡ or v¡ + d for each of them. Also, since the lowest standing
bid at the terminal stage is v¡, in both le and lf buyer i wins all units from sellers not in
S¡(v¡) with whom she holds high bids at ¡. The standing bids at these sellers do not change
in le.
Therefore, no matter what i's valuation is, it is su±cient to show that both the expected
number of units bought by i and the expected number of units that she buys from sellers S¡(v¡)
at price v¡ + d are weakly greater in lf than in le.
If i places her deviating bid bi at a seller z 62 S0
¡(v¡) (i.e. z's high bid is strictly above
v¡), then bi will never be outbid and i would for sure win z's unit because all buyers follow ¾¤
in lf and the lowest standing bid never exceeds v¡. The expected number of units that i wins
at sellers S¡(v¡) will either remain the same (if the valuation of buyer jz who is outbid at z
does not exceed v¡ and so jz will not bid in lf), or will decrease by at most 1 (if jz's valuation
exceeds v¡ and so jz will bid in lf). In either case, the expected number of units that i buys
from sellers W(i;d) at price v¡ + d is at least as large in lf as in le.
In the rest of the proof, suppose that bid bi is placed with a seller in S0
¡(v¡). Recall
that the lowest standing bid reaches v¡ at information set Sk in lk (k 2 fe;fg). Let h(k) be
the subset of the set of buyers Da
¡(v¡) who at information set Sk are high bidders with sellers
in S0
¡(v¡).
Since all buyers follow ¾¤ in le (lf), buyer i's expected payo® from trading with sellers
S¡(v¡) in either game is determined by #h(e) (#h(f)), w1, w2, and the value of the deviating
bid bi in lf. In particular, the expected number of units which i buys from sellers S¡(v¡) in





¡(v¡)¡#h(e) . To understand this expression, note that i
ends up buying all w2 units from sellers in W(i;d). Also, all buyers in Da
¡(v¡) end up trading
38with sellers from S0
¡(v¡) ½ S¡(v¡) (by de¯nition, #Da
¡(v¡) · #S0
¡(v¡)), and at information
set Se, #S0
¡(v¡)¡#h(e) of these buyers are not high bidders. So, the buyers in Da
¡(v¡)nh(e)
continue to submit bids v¡ +d in G¡ after information set Se randomizing uniformly over the
sellers with standing bid v¡. Hence, only #S0
¡(v¡) ¡ #Da
¡(v¡) of high bids equal to v¡ with
sellers in S0
¡(v¡) at information set Se will survive, each with equal probability, i.e. each of i's






Next, note that the price at a seller in W(i;d) rises to v¡ + d if an active buyer from
Da
¡(v¡) n h(e) happens to place her bid v¡ + d at this seller. So, by a similar computation,
the expected number of units that bidder i buys from sellers W(i;d) ½ S(v¡) at price v¡ + d,





In the continuation game lf we can perform similar computations taking into account
i's additional high bid bi. Particularly, if bi = v¡ (bi > v¡), then the expected number of













, while the expected number of units that she buys













If i places her deviating bid bi after the lowest standing bid has reached v¡ i.e. S0
precedes Se ´ Sf, then h(e) ´ h(f) and so ¼(v¡;le) < ¼0(v¡;lf) · ¼00(v¡;lf) and ¼(d;e) <
¼0(d;f) · ¼00(d;f) . Hence, i's expected payo® is strictly lower in lf than in le.
Next, suppose that at information set S0 where i makes her deviating bid bi, the
lowest standing bid is strictly below v¡. In this case, we will compare buyer i's expectations
E¼(v¡;e), E¼(d;e), E¼0(v¡;f), E¼00(v¡;f), E¼0(d;f), and E¼00(d;f) at information set S0.
These expectations do not depend on whether bi = v¡ or bi > v¡, as the other buyers do not
observe the value of bi, and so their actions prior to information set Sf are independent of this
value, and in either case bi remains a high bid at Sf. Therefore, since ¼0(v¡;f) · ¼00(v¡;f) and
¼0(d;f) · ¼00(d;f) for each w1, w2 and #h(f), it is su±cient to provide the proof for bi = v¡
only.
To compare E¼(v¡;e) with E¼0(v¡;f), and E¼(d;e) with E¼0(d;f), we need to char-
acterize the probability distributions of #h(e) and #h(f) in Se and Sf respectively. To do
so, ¯rst note that the set of high bidders with sellers in S0
¡(v¡) n S0
¡(v¡ ¡ d) is the same at
information sets Se and Sf as it remains unchanged since ¡.
39Let us now describe Pe
v¡(:) and P
f
v¡(:) - the probability distributions over the sets of high
bidders with sellers S0
¡(v¡) at information sets Se and Sf respectively. Pe
v¡(:) puts probability
1 on the subset of buyers in Da
¡(v¡ ¡ d) whose indices are between #S0
¡(v¡ ¡ 2d) + 2-th
and #S0
¡(v¡ ¡ d) + 1-th among the buyers in Da
¡(v¡ ¡ d) (each of these buyers has her ¯rst
opportunity to bid in le and lf only when the lowest standing bid reaches v¡ ¡d), and puts an
equal probability on any subset consisting of #S0
¡(bi¡2d) buyers from the set of #S0
¡(bi¡2d)+1
buyers in Da
¡(bi ¡ d) with the lowest indices.
On the other hand, P
f
v¡(:) puts probability 1 on the subset of buyers in Da
¡(v¡ ¡ d)
whose indices are between #S0
¡(v¡¡d)+2-th and #S0
¡(v¡)-th among the buyers in Da
¡(v¡¡d)
(these buyers have the ¯rst opportunity to bid in le and lf only when the lowest standing bid
reaches v¡ ¡ d), and puts equal probability on any subset consisting of #S0
¡(bi ¡ d) buyers
from the set of #S0
¡(bi ¡ d) + 1 buyers in Da
¡(bi ¡ d) with the lowest indices. Additionally, i's
deviating bid bi = v¡ remains a high bid in Sf and is held at a seller in S0
¡(v¡ ¡ d) (otherwise
bi could not have become a high bid). Note that i is not in Da
¡(v¡ ¡d) since at ¡ she holds at
least one high bid equal to v¡.
To summarize, the only di®erence between Pe
v¡(:) and P
f
v¡(:) is that Pe
v¡(:) puts proba-
bility 1 on the buyer with the #S0
¡(v¡)+1-th index in the set Da
¡(v¡¡d), whom we will denote
by j0 (this buyer is the last to place a high bid in le prior to Se) and puts zero probability




v¡(:) puts zero probability on j0 who never




probabilities on other sets of bidders. That is, let Bw
¡i¡j0 be a set of #S¡(v¡) ¡ 1 traders that
does not include buyers i or j0. Then Pe(Bw
¡i¡j0;j0) = Pf(Bw
¡i¡j0;i).
Then, to compare E¼(v¡;e) with E¼0(v¡;f), and E¼(d;e) with E¼0(d;f), ¯x Bw
¡i¡j0 -
the set of traders other than i and j0 who are high bidders with sellers in S0
¡(v¡). Let us com-





¡i¡j0;i). For any Bw
¡i¡j0, #h(f) = #h(e) if j0s valuation is equal to v¡, and
#h(f) = #h(e)+1 if j0s valuation is greater than v¡. Inspecting the relevant formulae, it is easy





¡i¡j0;i) for all Bw
¡i¡j0. Since Pe(Bw
¡i¡j0;j0) = Pf(Bw
¡i¡j0;i), we conclude that
E¼(v¡;e) · E¼0(v¡;f) and E¼(d;e) · E¼0(d;f). Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1: Consider the set N2 of sellers who post reserve prices equal to vm. A
40seller from N2 trades only if a buyer from M3 bids with her. After accounting for sellers from
N1 who trade for sure, the number of sellers from M3 who are available to bid with sellers
from N2 is at least m3 ¡n1. This gives the lower bound on the number of sellers from N2 who
trade.
To obtain the upper bound, note that on the equilibrium path buyers from M2 will bid
only with sellers from N1 while the standing bids at these sellers are below vm. Consider the
¯rst time t when the lowest standing bid in the market reaches vm. With a positive probability,
the realizations of random order of bidding and the randomization by buyers between the sellers
among whom they are indi®erent is such that at time t m0 buyers from M2 are the high bidders
at sellers from N1, where m0 is between maxf0;n1¡m3g and minfm2;n1g. Also, with a positive
probability all buyers from M3 who at time t are not winners yet, will bid at sellers from N2
¯rst. The number of buyers from M3 who will bid in this way is equal to: m3 ¡ (n1 ¡ m0).
Substituting for m0 we get the upper bound on the number of sellers from N2 who trade.
The proof establishing the lower and upper bounds on the number of buyers from M2
who trade is similar and is therefore omitted.
Lemmas from the proof of Theorem 2.
Proof of Lemma 3. By Claims 1 and 2, it is su±cient to compare the expected
payo®s that seller j gets after setting her reserve price at p ¡ d and at p when at least one
of these prices is pivotal. Let us consider all such cases. Note that a seller posting a pivotal
reserve price may fail to trade, if there are other sellers who post this reserve price or buyers
with valuations equal to this price. Below we consider all possible scenarios.
1. If p is pivotal but p¡d is not, then m1+n1 < m¡1 · m1+n1+m2+n0
2. So, irrespective
of seller j's reserve price, vm and hence the trading price are equal to p. Consequently,
if j sets reserve price p ¡ d she trades at price p for sure. If she sets reserve price p, she
may fail to trade if n1 + n0
2 ¸ m3 (or equivalently m1 + n1 + m2 + n0
2 ¸ m).
2. If p ¡ d is pivotal, but p is not, then m1 + n1 ¸ m. So, irrespective of seller j's reserve
price, vm (and hence the trading price) is equal to p ¡ d. Consequently, if j sets reserve
price p she fails to trade. If she sets reserve price p¡d, she may fail to trade. The upper
bound on her probability of trading will be derived below.
413. If both p ¡ d and p are pivotal, then m1 + n1 = m ¡ 1. So, if seller j posts reserve price
p ¡ d she will trade at this price for sure. If the seller sets reserve price p, the trading
price will be equal to p but seller j may fail to trade if m2 + n2 > 0.
To summarize, seller j gets a higher payo® by setting reserve price p¡d rather than p
if and only if the following inequality holds:
(p ¡ c) £ P(p is pivotal, p ¡ d is not pivotal, seller posting p fails to trade jcj)+
(p ¡ d ¡ c)(P(p is not pivotal, p ¡ d is pivotal, seller posting p ¡ d trades jcj)+
P(p is pivotal, p ¡ d is pivotal jcj))
¸ (p ¡ c)P(p is pivotal, p ¡ d is pivotal, seller posting p trades jcj) (6)
Obviously, (3) implies (6), and the two are equivalent when c = p ¡ d. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 7. Recall that both p and p¡d are pivotal i® m1+n1 = m¡1. Let
us compute the upper bound on the probability that seller j who has cost cj and posts price
p, trades at this price. Since all buyers follow strategy ¾¤, seller j can trade only with one of
m3 buyers whose valuations are strictly greater than p. By corollary 1, n1 sellers who post
reserve prices below p trade for sure. Some of these n1 sellers may trade with m2 buyers whose
valuations are equal to p. Therefore, the number of buyers who can trade with sellers posting
p is at most m3 +minf0;m2 ¡n1g, and is strictly smaller if some buyers with valuations equal
to p do not trade and some buyers with valuations above p trade with sellers whose reserve
prices are below p.
Seller j competes with the other n0
2 sellers who post reserve price p. According to
strategy ¾¤, a buyer who chooses among such sellers randomizes between them with equal
probability. It follows that, given the array of buyers' valuations and sellers' costs, the proba-




Finally, if m1+n1 = m¡1, then m3+minf0;m2¡n1g = 1 if m2 · n1 and 0 if m2 > n1.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 8. Recall that price p is pivotal, and p ¡ d is not pivotal i®
m1 + n1 < m ¡ 1 · m1 + n1 + m2 + n0
2.
When n0
2+1 sellers (including seller j) post price p, and at most m3+minf0;m2¡n1g
buyers are available to trade with these sellers, then the lower bound on the probability that

















jm1 = ^ m1;n1 = m ¡ 1 ¡ ^ m1;m2 · n1;cj)£
P(m1 = ^ m1;n1 = m ¡ 1 ¡ ^ m1;m2 · n1jcj) (7)





2 + 1 ¡ m3 ¡ minf0;m2 ¡ n1g
n0
2 + 1










2 + 1 ¡ m3 ¡ minf0;m2 ¡ n1g
n0
2 + 1















jm1 = ^ m1 ¡ 1;n1 = m ¡ ^ m1 ¡ 1;n0
2 ¸ 2;cj
¶











jm1 = ^ m1;n1 = m ¡ 2 ¡ ^ m1;n0
2 ¸ 2;cj
¶
£ P(m1 = ^ m1;n1 = m ¡ 2 ¡ ^ m1;n0
2 ¸ 2jcj) (8)
The ¯rst inequality holds because both the ¯rst and the second expressions are conditional
expectations of the same non-negative function, but in the ¯rst expression we condition on a
strictly larger set of events (m1 + n1 < n ¡ 1 and m1 + n1 + m2 + n0
2 ¸ m ¡ 1) than in the
second expression (m1 + n1 = m ¡ 2, and n0
2 ¸ 2). To get the second inequality, we rewrite
the expectation as summation in m1 and use the factor 1/2 to eliminate double counting, and
note that m3 + minf0;m2 ¡ n1g · 2, when m1 + n1 = m ¡ 2.
To complete the proof, we will establish that the expression on the right-hand side of
(8) is greater than the expression on the left-hand side of (7).
Let b (b¡i) denote the array of the realized valuations of all buyers' (all buyers other
than i). Similarly, let c (c¡j) denote the array of the realized costs of all sellers (all sellers
other than j). Let f(p) = min1·i·m;b¡i;c fi(pjb¡i;c), and g(p) = min1·j·n;c¡j;b gj(pjc¡j;b).
By assumption, f(p) > 0 and g(p) > 0 8p 2 D.
43Recall that m = nk, and let ® = maxf2k¡1
2k ;
3(1¡f(p))
3¡2f(p) g. We will consider two cases:
^ m1 ¸ ®m and ^ m1 < ®m. Before proceeding any further, we will need the following combina-
torial result.
Lemma 10 Consider N draws from the set fa;bg s.t. in each draw the probability of drawing
a is at most q and the probability of drawing b is at least q. Let na be the number of a's drawn
in N trials. Then for k ¸ 1 we have:
Prob(na = k) · Prob(na = k ¡ 1)
q
q
N ¡ k + 1
k
(9)
Proof. Let Ai1;:::;ik¡1 (Ai1;:::;ik) be an array of length n consisting of a's and b's s.t. the
number of a's in the array is k ¡ 1 (k) and they occupy positions i1;:::;ik¡1 (i1;:::;ik). Let
Ik¡1 (Ik) denote the set of all arrays of length N that contain k ¡ 1 (k) a's and N ¡ k + 1
(N ¡ k) b's. Then, Prob(na = k) =
P
Ai1;:::;ik2Ik Prob:(Ai1;:::;ik) and Prob(na = k ¡ 1) =
P
Ai1;:::;ik¡12Ik¡1 Prob(Ai1;:::;ik¡1).
Let us call arrays Ai1;:::;ik¡1 2 Ik¡1 and Ah1;:::;hk 2 Ik adjacent if Ai1;:::;ik¡1 and Ah1;:::;hk
have identical elements (either a or b) in all positions except for position hj, and b (a) occupies
position hj in array Ai1;:::;ik¡1 (Ai1;:::;ik).
For any array Ai1;:::;ik¡1 2 Ik¡1 there are N ¡ k + 1 arrays in Ik that are adjacent
to Ai1;:::;ik¡1. Any such adjacent array takes the form Ai1;:::;ik¡1;hj and is obtained from




Conversely, for any array Ah1;:::;hk 2 Ik there are k arrays in Ik¡1 that are adjacent
to it. Any such adjacent array A¡hj0 is obtained from Ah1;:::;hk by replacing a in some posi-




Consider set Bk¡1 that contains each array in Ik¡1 replicated N¡k+1 times. Similarly,
let Bk be the set containing each array in Ik replicated k times. Consider a bijection r(:)
between the elements of Bk¡1 and Bk such that each array in Bk¡1 corresponds to exactly
one adjacent array in Bk, and vice versa. As shown above, the ratio of the probability that












44Now we are ready to handle cases 1 and 2 separately.
Case 1: ^ m1 ¸ ®m. We will establish that 9m0(p) s.t. if m ¸ m0(p), then the term corre-
sponding to ^ m1 in the ¯rst expression after the last inequality in (8) is greater than the term







jm1 = ^ m1 ¡ 1;n1 = m ¡ 1 ¡ ^ m1;n0
2 ¸ 2;cj
¶






jm1 = ^ m1;n1 = m ¡ 1 ¡ ^ m1;m2 · n1;cj)P(m1 = ^ m1;n1 = m ¡ 1 ¡ ^ m1;m2 · n1jcj)
(10)
Note that by de¯nition ®m ¸ 2k¡1
2k m = m¡n=2 which is greater than m¡n+2 when n ¸ 4.
Also, ®m > 1 when m is su±ciently large. So, each ^ m1 ¸ ®m is within the range of the
summation in the ¯rst expression after the last inequality in (8) and the summation on the
right-hand side of (7). The proof of inequality (10) will be provided via a sequence of claims.
Claim 1:
P(n0
2<2;n1=m¡1¡ ^ m1;m1= ^ m1jcj)
P(n1=m¡1¡ ^ m1;m1= ^ m1jcj) · (n ¡ m + ^ m1 + 1)(1 ¡ g)n¡m+ ^ m1.
Let P(c¡zjb;cj) denote the probability distribution over the costs of n ¡ 1 sellers
conditional on the array of the valuations of m buyers b, and the cost cj of the seller j. Let
us number all n¡1 sellers other than j from 1 to n¡1 in some arbitrary way and let ci stand
for the cost of i's seller for i 2 f1;:::;n¡1g. By properties of conditional probability we have:
P(c¡zjb;cj) = P(cn¡1jb;cj;c1;:::;cn¡2) £ ::: £ P(cijb;cj;c1;:::;ci¡1) £ ::: £ P(c1jb;cj) (11)
Note that P(ci = pjb;cj;c1;:::;ci¡1) ¸ g(p) 8i 2 f1;:::;n ¡ 1g and 8p. This in combination
with (11) implies the following.
Let us use notation Sn¡1 to denote the set of all sellers except seller j. Let J n¡m+ ^ m1
denote a collection of all possible sets containing n¡m+ ^ m1 sellers, and let Bn¡m+ ^ m1 denote
a typical set in this collection. Since the sellers in (11) were numbered in an arbitrary way, 8
Bn¡m+ ^ m1 and 8p < p we have:
P(#fiji 2 Bn¡m+ ^ m1;ci = pg = 0jb;cj;fci ¸ p i® i 2 Bn¡m+ ^ m1g) · (1 ¡ g(p))n¡m+ ^ m1
P(#fiji 2 Bn¡m+ ^ m1;ci = pg = 1jb;cj;fci ¸ p i® i 2 Bn¡m+ ^ m1g)
· (n ¡ m + ^ m1)(1 ¡ g(p))(1 ¡ g(p))n¡m+ ^ m1¡1
45It follows that
P(n0
2 < 2;n1 = m ¡ 1 ¡ ^ m1;m1 = ^ m1jcj)
P(n1 = m ¡ 1 ¡ ^ m1;m1 = ^ m1jcj)
´ P(n0
2 < 2jm1 = ^ m1;n1 = m ¡ 1 ¡ ^ m1;cj) ·
(1 ¡ g(p))n¡m+ ^ m1 + (n ¡ m + ^ m1)(1 ¡ g(p))(1 ¡ g(p))n¡m+ ^ m1¡1 · (n ¡ m + ^ m1 + 1)(1 ¡ g)n¡m+ ^ m1
where g = minp2D g(p). Since n+ ^ m1¡m ¸ m=2k, (n¡m+ ^ m1+1)(1¡g)n¡m+ ^ m1 is decreasing
in m when m is su±ciently large, and converges to zero as m goes to in¯nity.
Claim 2.
P(m1 = ^ m1 ¡ 1;n1 = m ¡ 1 ¡ ^ m1;n0
2 = ^ n2jcj)
P(m1 = ^ m1;n1 = m ¡ 1 ¡ ^ m1;n0
2 = ^ n2jcj)
=
P(m1 = ^ m1 ¡ 1jn1 = m ¡ 1 ¡ ^ m1;n0
2 = ^ n2;cj)
P(m1 = ^ m1jn1 = m ¡ 1 ¡ ^ m1;n0










(1 ¡ ®) + 1=m
(12)
The equality holds by de¯nition. The ¯rst inequality follows from lemma 10. The second
inequality holds because ^ m1 ¸ ®m.





jm1 = ^ m1;n1 = m ¡ 1 ¡ ^ m1;cj)P(m1 = ^ m1;n1 = m ¡ 1 ¡ ^ m1jcj) ·
P(m1 = ^ m1;n1 = m ¡ 1 ¡ ^ m1;n0
2 < 2jcj) +
1
3
P(m1 = ^ m1;n1 = m ¡ 1 ¡ ^ m1;n0
2 ¸ 2jcj) ·
Ã
(n ¡ m + ^ m1 + 1)(1 ¡ g)n¡m+ ^ m1




P(m1 = ^ m1;n1 = m ¡ 1 ¡ ^ m1;n0
2 ¸ 2jcj) ·
Ã
(n ¡ m + ^ m1 + 1)(1 ¡ g)n¡m+ ^ m1






(1 ¡ ®) + 1=m
®
£
P(m1 = ^ m1 ¡ 1;n1 = m ¡ 1 ¡ ^ m1;n0
2 ¸ 2jcj) ·
1
6
P(m1 = ^ m1 ¡ 1;n1 = m ¡ 1 ¡ ^ m1;n0
2 ¸ 2jcj)
(13)
The ¯rst inequality follows by computation. The second inequality follows from Claim 1. The
third inequality follows from Claim 2.
To obtain the ¯nal inequality, note that 9~ m(p) s.t. if m > ~ m(p), then
(n¡m+ ^ m1+1)(1¡g)n¡m+ ^ m1
1¡(n¡m+ ^ m1+1)(1¡g)n¡m+ ^ m1 < 1=6, and so the expression in brackets in less than 1/2. Also,
since ® >
3(1¡f(p))




2(1¡f(p)), if m > 2
1¡®. Therefore, the ¯nal inequality
in (13) holds if m ¸ m0(p) ´ maxf~ m(p); 2
1¡®g.
Claim 4. The left-hand side of (10) is greater than 1
6P(m1 = ^ m1 ¡ 1;n1 = m ¡ 1 ¡ ^ m1;n0
2 ¸
2jcj). This is obvious.
46Thus, (10) holds when m ¸ ¹ m.
Case 2. ^ m1 < ®m. We will demonstrate that in this case 9m00(p) s.t. if m ¸ m00(p),
then the very last expression in (8) is greater than the expression on the right-hand side of (7).




n¡m+ ^ m1 X
^ n2=0
^ n2 + 1
^ n2 + 3
P(m1 = ^ m1 + 1;n1 = m ¡ ^ m1 ¡ 3;n0
2 = ^ n2 + 2jcj) ¸
minf®m;m¡1g X
^ m1=maxf0;m¡ng
n¡m+ ^ m1 X
^ n2=0
1
^ n2 + 1
P(m1 = ^ m1;n1 = m ¡ 1 ¡ ^ m1;n0
2 = ^ n2;m2 · n1jcj) (14)
Since ® < 1 , the upper bound in the ¯rst summation on both sides is equal to ®m
when m is su±ciently large. Let us show that (14) holds term by term for each ^ m1 < ®m and
^ n2 when m is su±ciently large. By lemma 10,
P(m1 = ^ m1 + 1;n1 = m ¡ ^ m1 ¡ 3;n0
2 = ^ n2 + 2jcj) ¸
µ
g(p)
1 ¡ g(p) ¡ ::: ¡ g(p)
¶2 f(p) + ::: + f(p ¡ d)
1 ¡ f(p) ¡ ::: ¡ f(p)
(m ¡ ^ m1 ¡ 2)(m ¡ ^ m1 ¡ 1)(m ¡ ^ m1)
(^ n2 + 2)(^ n2 + 1)(^ m1 + 1)
£
£ P(m1 = ^ m1;n1 = m ¡ ^ m1 ¡ 1;n0
2 = ^ n2jcj) (15)
Hence,
^ n2 + 1
^ n2 + 3
P(m1 = ^ m1 + 1;n1 = m ¡ ^ m1 ¡ 3;n0
2 = ^ n2 + 2jcj) ¸
µ
g(p)
1 ¡ g(p) ¡ ::: ¡ g(p)
¶2 f(p) + ::: + f(p ¡ d)
1 ¡ f(p) ¡ ::: ¡ f(p)
(m ¡ ^ m1 ¡ 2)(m ¡ ^ m1 ¡ 1)(m ¡ ^ m1)(^ n2 + 1)
(^ n2 + 3)(^ n2 + 2)(^ m1 + 1)
µ
1
^ n2 + 1
P(m1 = ^ m1;n1 = m ¡ 1 ¡ ^ m1;n0
2 = ^ n2jcj)
¶
(16)
Let us now establish that
(m¡ ^ m1¡2)(m¡ ^ m1¡1)(m¡ ^ m1)(^ n2+1)
(^ n2+3)(^ n2+2)( ^ m1+1) goes to in¯nity as m increases. First
^ n2+1
^ n2+3 ¸ 1=3. Second, m¡ ^ m1
^ m1+1 ¸ 1¡®
®+1=m ¸ 1¡®




k +2 which is greater
than
(1¡®)
2(1=k+1¡®) when m ¸ 2
1¡®.
Finally, m ¡ ^ m1 ¡ 2 ¸ (1 ¡ ®)m ¡ 2 ¸ m £ minf 1
2k;
f(p)
3¡2f(p)g ¡ 2, which converges to
in¯nity as m increases. It follows that 9m00(p) s.t. if m ¸ m00(p), then (14) holds. So, the
Lemma holds if we choose N ¸ maxfm0(p);m00(p)g. Q.E.D.
47